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Abstract 
The paper studies the comparative stability of foreign owned manufacturing firms in Wales. The 
paper uses as a framework the Welsh Register of Manufacturing Employment which records details of 
regional manufacturing entry and exits since 1966. The paper is set in the context of competing claims 
on the more transformative effects of inward investment with some stressing that notions of DµQHZ
UHJLRQDOLVP¶LQ:DOHVKDve been unjustly founded on assumptions about the transforming effects of 
foreign investment. There is also a problem of a paucity of research showing how foreign investment 
had been involved in evolutionary processes of regional economic change. The paper shows that a 
more complete appreciation of the role of inward investment needs to consider its role in job creation, 
but also the relative stability of the investment and jobs attracted. The paper also reveals how 
analysis of plant birth and deaths also links through to perspectives offered by evolutionary economic 
geography, and how patterns of entry and exit might work to influence the economic trajectories of a 
disadvantaged region such as Wales.  
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The stability of the foreign manufacturing sector: Evidence and Analysis for Wales 1966-2003 
 
Introduction 
The activity of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries across the UK regions has been widely studied. A 
series of papers have examined the embeddedness of foreign manufacturing in UK regions (see for 
example, Phelps et al., 2003). Embeddedness is multi-faceted and can embrace issues such as the 
intensity of buyer-supplier linkages of foreign plants, and the types of functions undertaken within 
these plants (for a discussion of these issues in relation to foreign capital see Munday et al., 1995; 
Welsh Government, 2009; see also Wren and Jones, 2009). However, the embeddedness of foreign 
plants also embraces the longevity and stability of activity supported.  
   This paper examines patterns of foreign firm entry and exit in the Welsh economy. Prior analyses of 
foreign manufacturing stability and survival have been hindered, in part, by limits on data availability. 
However, Wales has an official database (Welsh Register of Manufacturing Employment) providing 
details of regional manufacturing entry and exits between 1966 and the mid-2000s. This offers an 
opportunity to examine foreign manufacturing entry and exit rates in Wales and builds upon an 
evidence base of relatively few UK studies (but see Jones and Wren, 2006; Wren and Jones, 2009; 
McCloughan and Stone, 1998; Stone and Peck, 1996). 
   The paper is set within the context of debates on how far inward investment across the UK regions 
including Wales has had a transforming effect in terms of improving regional economic development 
prospects. Examining the stability of the foreign sector, we believe, provides an answer to part of this 
puzzle. The paper examines three questions. First, whether the Welsh evidence reveals that survival 
rates of foreign owned manufacturing firms are significantly higher than those for domestic firms. 
Second, whether there is variation in survival rates in foreign manufacturing companies through 
different time periods. Third whether survival rates of foreign manufacturing plants vary in terms of 
employment size, industry sector and location within Wales.  
   The second section sets the analysis of foreign manufacturing stability in the context of regional 
debates in Wales (and other UK regions) on how far the presence of inward investment has had long 
term transforming beneficial effects on the regional economy. The third section reviews literature on 
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foreign firm survival linking this through to issues of foreign ownership, age, size, timing of entry, 
industry and location. The fourth describes the database used for the analysis, and examines entry and 
exit rates of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries. The fifth section describes the method used to 
explore the comparative survival rates of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries, and discusses the results 
from the analysis. The final section concludes.    
 
Why examine the stability of the foreign manufacturing sector? 
Wales is an interesting lens through which to examine issues around foreign manufacturing plant 
stability. Research has highlighted the success of Wales in attracting inward investment (Hill and 
Munday, 1994).  Tewdwr Jones and Phelps (2000) consider Welsh advantages over other regions in 
terms of the inward investment process, and how the land use planning system had been used in the 
SURPRWLRQDQGµJD]XPSLQJ¶LQWKHORFDWLRQWRXUQDPHQWSURFHVVHowever, while Wales and other 
devolved UK administrations may have had processual advantages in terms of bidding for mobile 
capital investments, there is a question as to whether these advantages are reflected in dynamic 
changes levered for the Welsh economy through new inward investment.  
   Accounts of the role of inward investment in Wales have been broadly positive with research 
pointing to impacts in terms of new jobs, higher exports, and spillovers of new knowledge and 
techniques to indigenous firms (for a review see Welsh Government, 2009). However regional claims 
of the more transformative effects of inward investment to Wales have been questioned. Indeed the 
1990s saw a significant policy shift towards the development of indigenous firms and with the Welsh 
Development Agency (WDA) role in terms of overseas marketing increasingly scrutinised (Welsh 
Government, 2009). Concerns on the role of inward investment were also voiced by authors such as 
Lovering (1999). He showed tKDWWKHQRWLRQRIDµQHZUHJLRQDOLVP¶LQ:DOHVhad been unjustly 
founded on assumptions about the transforming effects of foreign manufacturing investment. These 
notions had EHHQµDFFRPSDQLHG¶E\DSDXFLW\RIUHVHDUFKshowing how foreign investment had been 
involved in evolutionary processes of Welsh economic change. Indeed, Lovering (1999) questioned 
WDA activity toward inward investment and claims of a resulting regional manufacturing 
UHQDLVVDQFH³7KHHQGOHVVO\UHSHDWHGFODLPWKDWLQZDUGLQYHVWPHQWLQWR:DOHVKDVKDGD
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transformative influence on the regional economy as a whole is entirely lacking in evidence. Over the 
decade to 1995 foreign direct investment created net very few jobs indeed (it is not possible to say 
H[DFWO\KRZIHZEHFDXVHQRV\VWHPDWLFUHVHDUFKKDVHYHUEHHQFRQGXFWHG´ (Lovering, 1999, p381).  
Lovering shows the need for a more critical examination of the contribution of inward investment as 
opposed to a tendency to merely celebrate new inward investment. Others had also commented on 
longer term developmental concerns.  Williams et al. (1992), for example, commenting on Japanese 
inward investment in the UK regions, showed that such investments featured lower value added 
IXQFWLRQVDQGPLJKWKDYHEHHQEHWWHUFKDUDFWHULVHGDVµZDUHKRXVHV¶UDWKHUWKDQIDFWRULHV(see also 
Munday et al., 1995).  
   The context for our study are thus the historical concerns on the role of inward investment in 
regional economic development, concerns about the potentially transitory nature of selected 
investments, and then how far policy resources can be developed not merely to attract foreign firms 
but to make operations more sustainable through repeat investment. Analysis of the stability of 
foreign owned firms and their role in the evolutionary development processes should then be part of 
the wider policy evaluation process, and the discussion of how policy towards inward investors may 
have to evolve to lever longer term developmental benefits. In this respect Phelps and Fuller (2000) 
show that it could be important for policy resources to be used to cultivate the allegiance of capital. 
Phelps and Fuller show that the pro-competitive disengagement by government on inward investment 
attraction may sit uneasily with policies that seek to improve the embeddedness of foreign capital. In 
particular the need for significant levels of aftercare for inward investors might be seen as an 
admission that large sums committed in location tournaments have only succeeded in attracting 
enterprises to areas where they struggle to be successful because more weighty matters of regional 
production conditions have been ignored in location decisions.  More generally, Welsh Government 
(2009) highlighted a need for policymakers to question how well location marketing policies to 
inward investors were integrated into overall regional economic development strategy in Wales.  
   A corollary of this more critical appraisal of inward investment policy is that a more complete 
appreciation of the role of inward investment needs to consider its role in job creation, but also the 
relative stability of the investment and jobs attracted. For example, Essletzbichler (2007) shows that it 
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is a better understanding of the driving forces of job creation and destruction in British areas which is 
important for appropriate policy responses, and that net employment change figures can work to mask 
significant levels of job creation and destruction. Then an important question is whether the relatively 
high inward investment job creation rates claimed for Wales DUHµPDUUHG¶E\UHODWLYHO\KLJKOHYHOVRI
foreign plant exit. Essletzbichler (2007) makes the key point that high rates of entry and employment 
are not necessarily the most important processes to generate net employment growth. Regions that are 
potentially transformed by the presence of foreign multinationals might also be characterised by low 
rates of foreign exit.  
   The analysis of plant birth and deaths in a region also connects through to perspectives offered by 
evolutionary economic geography, and the processes through which regions transform themselves, 
and the processes by which the economic landscape, the spatial organisation of economic production, 
distribution and consumption is transformed over time (Boschma and Martin, 2007). Geroski (1995) 
argues that understanding rates of exit and entry is important in examining the evolution of industry 
populations over time. Essletzbichler and Rigby (2007) show that competition between agents based 
on the evolutionary factors of variety, selection and retention can work to produce distinct economic 
regions. Arguably foreign owned firms are among the most significant agents in regions. Patterns of 
entry and exit among such firms could work to influence the economic trajectories of a region such as 
Wales. Martin and Sunley (2006) also show that it is unclear why selected areas become locked into 
development paths that lose dynamism, while other areas are better able to reinvent themselves 
WKURXJKQHZGHYHORSPHQWSKDVHV+HUHWKHQVRPHUHJLRQVILQGLWPRUHGLIILFXOWWKDQRWKHUVWRµVKDNH
IUHH¶RIWKHLULQdustrial history. In the context of these perspectives from evolutionary economic 
geography, the entry and exit of foreign firms in Wales could have important longer term effects and 
with current economic concerns in Wales focused on the long term persistence of a low skills 
equilibrium, low average productivity levels, and low levels of business spending on R&D (Welsh 
European Funding Office, 2013).  
   Wales is therefore a particularly interesting example through which to examine entry and exit of 
foreign plants. Our analysis addresses a challenge from Lovering (1999) for more detailed research to 
examine claims on the worth of the foreign-owned sector to the Welsh economy. Findings may assist 
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in the development of appropriate regional development policy, and provide insights into the forces 
driving the development path of the region and this in the context of persistent socio-economic 
disadvantage experienced by some parts of industrial Wales.   
    
Foreign manufacturing entry and exit 
There is a substantial body of work in the US, Europe and the UK that has addressed manufacturing 
exits. Key issues examined include the impact of general exits on national productivity, employment 
restructuring and employment change. Here however we focus the review around themes of 
ownership, industry, plant size, age and location which are examined later through the empirical 
work. 
Foreign Ownership 
The relative and absolute survival rates of foreign subsidiaries have been considered in a number of 
research studies in the UK and Ireland. This research has been linked to levels of public support given 
to inward investors, and with longstanding concerns going back to the 1960s and 1970s that subsidies 
and other types of assistance might attract more transient cost sensitive investment to peripheral areas. 
In consequence the attraction of weakly embedded foreign capital could deepen the µbranch plant 
syndrome¶. McAleese and Counahan (1979) examined the statistical relationship in Ireland between 
foreign plant size, marketing autonomy, and employment performance. They concluded from a study 
of exit rates that multinational enterprises were no more footloose than their domestic counterparts. 
Studies analysing historical employment statistics for the UK regions also reveal greater stability in 
the foreign sector at times of domestic economic problems (see Hill and Munday, 1994; Welsh 
Government, 2009). Stone and Peck (1996) using a components of change analysis examined the 
stability of foreign-owned manufacturing plants across four UK regions including Wales. One of their 
conclusions was that regional inward investment success was not merely determined by the opening 
of new foreign plants, but also in terms of strong performances in other components of change such as 
closures, acquisitions, exits, and in-situ changes.  
   Another study focusing on the foreign sector in the UK was McCloughan and Stone (1998) who 
undertook a duration analysis of 252 plants in the North East region between 1970-1993 estimating 
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the contribution of plant level characteristics seen to affect survival rates. They revealed that 
greenfield entrants were characterized by a lower risk of failure than acquisition entrants. This was 
linked to factors such as problems in integrating acquired subsidiaries, that acquisition is a root to 
industry rationalisation, and that new greenfield entrants have access to up to date technology and 
were more likely to benefit from employment and capital subsidies.      
  More recent detailed research has also taken place in the North East region. Jones and Wren (2006) 
find that the overall probability of survival duration of inward investors was longer for plants pledging 
more than 50 jobs and in plants that were involved with the regional development agency. A key 
theme in this research was factors affecting prospects for re-investment with the study revealing that 
the probability of reinvestment increases then decreases with plant size, and increases based on 
whether or not firms have received financial assistance. Wren and Jones (2009) examined 265 plants 
in the North East that started in foreign ownership after 1985. The study used a proportional hazards 
model to analyse plant survival behaviour. This research revealed that in comparison to domestic 
plants, foreign-owned plants had higher exit rates. Importantly, however, in an analysis of 
reinvestment patterns and impacts on survival duration, the authors find little support for re-
investment as a source of plant embeddedness. 
   In conclusion the issue of ownership is identified as one potential factor affecting survival duration 
of plants in UK regions. The Welsh evidence on foreign and domestic firm employment trends during 
the recent past (see Welsh Government, 2009) leads to the prior that foreign firms may be 
characterised by better survival rates than domestically owned firms. The nature of the data available 
to this study limits the avenues that can be pursued within the theme of ownership. For example 
international research picks up on the expected significance of issues such as mode of entry/type of 
investment (i.e. greenfield or through merger and acquisition) in influencing survival outcomes (see 
for example, Li, 1995). The nature of the data used later in the paper make it difficult to comment on 
how this factor would impact survival duration in the case region.  
Age, Entry Date and Size 
Wren and Jones (2009) show that the size and age of a plant are expected to be factors explaining the 
survival duration of foreign subsidiaries.  These factors could impact strongly on trends in re-
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investment and the size of a foreign subsidiary might impact its ability to gain new funding and re-
investment. Size might link through to the level of sunk costs committed, and the ability of a foreign 
subsidiary to compete with other subsidiaries for subsequent rounds of investment in new products 
(see Phelps and Fuller, 2000).  
   Li (1995) revealed that the exit rate of foreign owned firms increases with the age of the operation 
but only XSWRDFHUWDLQSRLQW/LXVHVWKHWHUPµhRQH\PRRQHIIHFW¶WRGHVFULEHWKLVSDWWHUQVKRZLQJ
that the initial resources used to support the subsidiary could insulate it from early failure. Age of 
plant might also link through to multinational firm experience of the host nation and this has also been 
shown to affect survival prospects (see for example, Delios and Beamish, 2001). 
   The age and size of subsidiaries has also been an important theme in other UK studies. For example, 
McCloughan and Stone (1998) explored whether the hazard function facing foreign firms in the North 
East region displayed negative duration dependence i.e. the longer the foreign plant survives, the 
lower its risk of failure becomes. They contend that this might be the case because foreign firms use 
their ownership advantages gradually and with the possibility here that foreign firms may develop 
new ownership advantages post entry.    Moreover in one previous study of foreign firm exits in 
Wales by Evans et al. (2009), examining the period 1985-2007, the hazard rate analysis revealed that 
the date of entry into Wales was a factor in survival duration.  
Industry effects 
Prior empirical work internationally and in the UK would also suggest that exit (and entry) rates vary 
across industry. The fact that foreign subsidiaries differ in terms of product life cycle position would 
also give rise to variation in exit rates by industry. In Wales, for example, there have been noticeable 
periods of displacement of more labour intensive manufacturing sectors such as electrical engineering 
to locations in eastern Europe and further afield due to their relative cost competitiveness (Welsh 
Assembly Government, 2009). 
   More generally Driffield (1999) studied a series of industry specific factors associated with foreign 
manufacturing entry and exit and revealed that higher rates of exit were connected with low 
profitability, low overall industry growth and low net capital. Driffield also found that foreign firms 
were unlikely to exit industries where foreign firms possessed a strong productivity advantage.  
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Location 
The location of plants may also have an impact on an exit rates. On location there could be some 
expectation that firms locating in assisted areas, or assisted parts of regions could be more marginal 
(i.e. more grant dependent), and thus have lower survival rates, and with this being an underlying 
theme of a series of analyses of the relative employment stability of foreign owned plants, and the 
longer term value for money in using policy resources in the form of grants and subsidies to foreign 
investors (see earlier). Assisted areas offering higher levels of grants and subsidies may suffer from 
not having the wider infrastructure of skills and suppliers to embed foreign firms. However, Jones and 
Wren (2006) in their study of inward investment in the North East of England show that the 
probability of reinvestment increases where firms have had a grant. 
   In this paper on Wales we are only able to explore whether there are differences in exit rates 
between plants in areas receiving different levels of assistance. However, more detailed spatial data 
on plant location could shed light on more subtle location issues including whether firms have plants 
co-located on the same site, whether plants are co-locating close to similar industrial activity and 
whether plants that exit subsequently relocate to other parts of the region (see for example, Wren and 
Jones, 2009 for a discussion of these types of issues). 
 
Foreign manufacturing in Wales 
General background 
Foreign manufacturing has a long history in Wales with the first recorded firm (Monsanto) arriving in 
1895. By 1974, foreign owned manufacturing employed an estimated 53,000 people. North American 
firms dominated foreign inward investment inflows into Wales until the 1970s (Davies and Thomas, 
1976).  The number of European and Japanese manufacturing investments in the Welsh total 
increased sharply in the 1980s. There was a shake-out in Welsh manufacturing after 1980, and by 
1984, foreign owned manufacturing employment had fallen to around 40,000, but rose steadily after 
this reaching an estimated 75,000 by 1996.  Munday (2000) shows that employment and output in the 
foreign owned manufacturing sector in Wales was relatively stable in the 1980s and 1990s but 
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underlying that stability was a growing number of foreign takeovers of domestic firms (see also 
Phelps (1997) for further analysis of the embeddedness of the foreign sector in the Welsh economy).  
   Wales was relatively successful in attracting foreign direct investment in the 1980s (Hill and 
Munday, 1994).  Over the whole period since 1980, Welsh Government (2009) reveals that it was 
expansion projects that comprised the largest share of total foreign projects success, followed by new 
projects. In total Wales is estimated to have secured almost 1,500 overseas inward investment projects 
between 1984 and 2007, with an estimated £13.5bn of planned capital investment, and almost 100,000 
planned new jobs and 70,000 safeguarded jobs (Welsh Government, 2009; for recent commentary on 
Welsh inward investment trends see Crawley et al., 2012). 
Data on foreign manufacturing exits 
The main statistical sources for examining foreign direct investment trends into Wales are the Census 
of Production (for the period until 1997) the Annual Business Inquiry (from 1998) and the Inter-
Departmental Business Register, and the Business Register and Employment Survey after 2008. These 
tend to focus on employment and output indicators and provide little information on the life duration 
of foreign plants. There are, however, additional data sources.  
   One is the Welsh Register of Manufacturing Employment (WRME), initially compiled by the Welsh 
Office, and most recently by Welsh Government before being discontinued in the mid-2000s. The 
WRME maintained a record of manufacturing plants with more than 10 employees at a single site in 
Wales. The information recorded on WRME was collected at the end of each calendar year using a 
postal survey and telephone follow-up. Additional updating in-year was undertaken using a range of 
statistical and administrative sources such as the Census of Employment, Census of Production, Inter-
Departmental Business Register (IDBR) and Dun & Bradstreet data. 
   The primary variables recorded on WRME are employment, industry, initial country of ownership, 
whether the plant is part of a multi-plant enterprise, location and opening and closure dates. In some 
cases (partial) data on the type of opening, being a New Branch, if the new plant is opened by an 
enterprise with other manufacturing units already in operation, a Transfer, if the formation of the new 
plant corresponds to a closure of one or more existing plants, and an Enterprise New to Manufacturing 
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(ENM), if the new plant is opened by an enterprise previously not having other plants within the 
regional manufacturing sector, is also available.  
   To make full use of the time series and cross-section dimensions of the WRME data a complete list 
of records were extracted providing records on 6,372 plants with at least one year of data. 1 
Manufacturing plant entry and exit 1966-2003 
In what follows we summarise some of the findings from an analysis of the WRME database. 
Selected material here is derived from an initial analysis undertaken by Paull (2007)2. From the 6,372 
records taken from the WRME, data on 6,115 domestic and foreign plants remained for the analysis 
after some cleaning for incomplete records. Table 1 reveals the composition of the records for 
selected years between 1966 and 2003. Across all years of the dataset the primary geographies of 
origin for the recorded foreign owned plants are from the European Union and North America (in 
2003 providing 34.9% and 43.2% of foreign owned plants, respectively) with plants owned by Asian 
companies additionally providing a notable component. Over the full time period, there is some trend 
towards an increased relative representation for foreign owned manufacturing plants rising from 9.7% 
of total plants in 1966 to over 18% since 1997. 
   Examination of the estimated mean average size by employee numbers (see Table 1) suggests that 
Welsh owned single-plants have tended to have the smallest mean size. The data also points to a trend 
for a declining mean plant size of both domestic and foreign owned plants during the period from 
1966 to the mid-1980s, in the case of domestic owned plants falling from 171.4 employees in 1966 to 
63.0 employees in 1986 and for foreign owned plants from 511.9 in 1966 to 197.4 in 1986 before both 
stabilising at a mean plant size of around 70 employees and 200 employees, respectively. The 
similarity in the percentage decline of mean plant sizes is an interesting feature, perhaps suggestive of 
wider factors in manufacturing technologies and production changes, though this is a question 
requiring more detailed research not specifically addressed within this study. 
Table 1 about here 
The data on recorded total stock of plants showed an increase from 1,432 plants in 1966 to a peak of 
2,812 in 1977.  After this there was a fairly persistent decline with the stock of plants reaching 1,713 
plants by 2003.  However, the data on foreign-owned plants in the database shows a very different 
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pattern. In 1966, there were 139 plant records on the database. With the exception of a few years 
where foreign plant numbers fall, the trend was steadily upwards until 1991 when there were 394 
foreign plants recorded. Between 1991-2000 numbers of foreign plants hovered around 370, before 
falling more sharply in the period 2000-2003. At the end of the period there were 315 foreign plants 
on the database.  
   Figure 1 summarises the aggregate time series of employee numbers on the database. This exhibits a 
general increase from the initial 1966 base period of 292,760 employees (but falling to 286,706 in 
1967) to peaks of 327,245 employees in 1970, followed by a modest decline until 1972, before rising 
again to a peak of 332,353 employees in 1974. A generally modest rate of decline then follows until 
around 1979, followed by a significant sharp fall in recorded employment reaching 207,137 
HPSOR\HHVGXULQJ WKH HDUO\¶V UHFHVVLRQ UHSUHVHQWLQJDGHFOLQHRI% between the peak of 
1974 and 1983. The data from 1983 onwards exhibits some greater stability, with a period of 
employment recovery from 1986 to around 1989, reaching 227,656 employees, before reverting 
towards a more general pattern of decline, which according to this data had perhaps slightly 
accelerated since around the end of the late 1990s.   
Figure 1 about here 
Of interest is the role of foreign manufacturing industry employment in the total. In 1966 employment 
in the foreign owned sector was a little over 71,000. This reached nearly 89,000 in 1974, and still 
stood at over 86,000 in 1980. During the early 1980s there was a major shakeout in all manufacturing 
in Wales, and over the period 1983-1986 around 67,000 people were employed in the foreign owned 
plants. Thereafter there was steady growth until 1990.   Foreign manufacturing employment totalled 
over 70,000 employees through the 1990s, but with a noticeable decline in employee numbers after 
1998. However, Figure 1 reveals that the contribution of foreign manufacturing to total manufacturing 
employment tends to have increased through time until 2003. For example, on average through the 
1970s foreign manufacturing employment was 27% of total employment, in the 1980s, 32%, and in 
the 1990s, 39%. 
   As noted earlier, in addition to the growth or decline in employment within incumbent plants the 
observed size distribution on the WRME database is also likely to be influenced by the entry of new 
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plants and exit of existing plants. From the cleaned WRME dataset, information on opening dates was 
only available for 4,662 plants (of which 739 plants were recorded as having opened prior to 1966) 
with records for 3,252 plant closing dates. To address these data gaps the available information was 
supplemented by additional estimates using the observed beginning and final years of employment 
data on each individual plant time series as proxies for opening and closing dates. Plants without a 
closure date and with employment information in 2003 were assumed to remain in operation. Where 
no such information was entered for a plant it was assumed that the plant closed within 2003. 
Although it may be that for some plants this simply represented a single point of missing data in 2003 
rather than closure, no other appropriate treatment is obvious in the absence of further information.  
   Examination of the constructed plant entry data, presented in Table 2, suggests some volatility, 
peaking at a high of 492 newly recorded plants in 1975 (a year with an unusually high number of 
recorded plants with employee numbers below the more than 10 employees official threshold)3 and 
reaching a low of just 14 recorded new plants in 2003.  
Table 2 about here 
In the case of the latter figure relating to plant exit in 2003, this could also reflect specific data 
collection issues within the final years of operating the dataset, and with the series discontinued 
shortly afterwards. However, the plant entry figure has been consistently below 100 since 1991. 
Excluding the year 1975, the entry rate (measured as a percentage of plant stock) was generally stable 
throughout the 1970s to the mid-1980s at around 6 - 8%. However, from around 1987 onwards a 
notable decline in entry rates is observed falling from 6.1% to around 1.5 - 3.5%, perhaps reflective of 
changing technologies and market conditions within some parts of the manufacturing sector in Wales.    
   Plant exits showed some increase from the late 1960s to a peak of 371 plants exiting in 1978, since 
when there has been some volatility with further peaks in 1985 at 257 plant exits, 190 plant exits in 
1991 and 181 plant exits in 2000. Exit rates also exhibit volatility ranging from a low of 0.9 % in 
1968 to highs of 13.2 % in 1978 and 10.2 % in 1985. The data points to greater volatility in plant exit 
rates than entry rates, which may again to some extent reflect the structural changes within the 
manufacturing sector experienced over this time period. This could also reflect closures linked to 
changes in the economic cycle, for example, high exit rates occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
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during a recessionary period. However, the data on periods of high exit rates does not always correlate 
well with periods when the UK experienced recession. Pike (1999) in a study of the North East of 
England reveals that an effect of inward investment arriving in waves could be associated with 
periods of regional economic stability, but then periods of instability. For example, there could be the 
possibility that firms that enter as a wave also exit in similar waves. This pattern appears to have 
occurred with much of the Japanese investment that entered Wales in the early 1980s in response to 
tariff pressures (Munday et al., 1995), but subsequently relocated to Eastern Europe and further afield 
in response the availability of cheaper labour costs, and with selected products entering the decline 
stages of their product cycles. 
   From 1966 until 1977 the recorded annual plant exits were lower than plant entries, providing a 
positive net effect on the stock of plants. Between the years 1978-1990 the picture was more mixed in 
terms of the net contribution to plant stock with particularly significant net plant losses in 1977 and 
1978. Post-1991 in every year the recorded stock of manufacturing plants has been in decline. 
   Closer inspection of plant entry and exit by size-classes showed that plant entry was primarily into the 
smaller size-classes, including into the size-classes below the WRME recording threshold, especially in the 
period 1975-1977. The constructed data on plant exits by size-class indicates a very limited exit of 
larger plants with most exits (in absolute terms) occurring within the smaller size-classes, particularly 
around or just above the official recording size threshold. 
   Examination of industry-level entry across the full time period (post-1966) of the dataset  showed a 
relative concentration in Fabricated metal products, providing 588 new entrants, Other machinery and 
equipment, 484 new entrants, Furniture, 383 new entrants, and Rubber and plastic products, 381 new 
entrants. Similarly, plant exits were highest in Fabricated metal products, where 569 plants exited, and 
Other machinery and equipment where 470 plants exited. Such information clearly suggests some 
consistency of those industries with the highest levels of entry and exit. Constructed data on entry and 
exit rates by industry in many cases provided very small samples, precluding any significant analysis 
from being presented.   
   Bringing together the data on plant entry and exit and the changes in employment within incumbent 
plants, gross and net employment flows were constructed for the time period 1967-2003 (the yea
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1966 not being examined due to the absence on information on the initial stock of plants and 
employment for the beginning of that year). Given the issue in some cases of precisely matching 
opening and closure dates with initial and final employment records, a full components of change 
decomposition into the effects of entry, exit, expansion and contractions is difficult, and with the 
discussion here considering gross and net flows - gross gains in employment arising from the 
contribution of entry and plant expansions, and gross losses from contractions and plant exits, the net 
flow being the sum of these effects. 
   The data, set out in Table 3, indicates significant annual gross gains and losses in employee numbers 
with the gross employment flows being considerably larger than the net flows recorded for each year, 
both gross flows generally being above 10,000 employees. Over the whole time period the average 
employment gains were 16,762 per annum with average losses of 20,202, a net average loss of 3,440 
jobs each year. However, it is not the case there has been an even and continuous process of net 
employment erosion within the manufacturing sector in Wales. Interestingly, however, in almost 
every year of the data (except for 1981, 1992 and each of the years after 1999) the number of plants 
experiencing increased employee numbers exceeded the number of plants exhibiting reduced 
employee numbers.  
Table 3 about here 
Comparison of the gross gains and losses data point to short periods of intensive employment 
shakeout in 1971, 1975-1976, 1980-1983, in the early 1990s and again in the early 2000s. The net 
employment effects were over 100,000 job losses in the period 1978-1983, a further net loss of almost 
32,000 jobs between 1991-1993 and over 33,000 jobs lost in the period 1999-2003. The fall in gross 
gains to a low of 9,406 employees in combination with the increase in gross losses of over 50,000 
employees in 1981, had a particularly significant effect, reducing overall recorded manufacturing 
employment by over 41,000 employees in that single year.   
 
Estimation and analysis 
Having described general trends in the WRME dataset the analysis now switches to consider whether 
foreign firms in this dataset exhibited stronger survival rates than other firms, and what factors might 
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account for this.  To examine the impact of ownership on plant/firm survival a Cox proportional 
hazard model is used. This specifies the hazard function as  ݄ሺݐሻ ൌ ݄଴ሺݐሻǤ ሺݔ௜ǡ ߚሻ  
where ݄ሺݐሻ is the rate at which plants/firms close at time ݐ given that they survived until ݐ െ  ?  and ݄଴ 
is an unspecified baseline hazard function, ݔ௜ǡ  is a vector of explanatory variables and ߚ a vector of 
unknown regression coefficients to be estimated. 
 
The variables used are derived from the data discussed in section 3. The dependent variable is the 
survival rate based on the length of time the plant/firm has operated in Wales. The explanatory 
variables include firm ownership measured as a series of dichotomous variables according to whether 
the plant/firm is foreign owned (Foreign), Welsh owned (Wales), other UK owned (UK) or if 
ownership is not known (Own NK). UK owned firms are taken as the reference group in the more 
detailed analysis of ownership patterns. There is some expectation that the Not-Known category in 
WRME data may be acting in the same way as a micro firm dummy with 97% of the firms 
categorised as not known employing 10 people or less, and with 71% employing 5 people or less. The 
prior here following the review is that firms which are foreign owned will be characterised by better 
survival rates and thus lower hazard ratios than domestically owned firms. There are also 
dichotomous variables for whether the plant/firm was located within an Intermediate or Development 
Area within Wales (INT AREA & DEV AREA) and describing 23 separate manufacturing industry 
groups in terms of two digit Standard Industrial Classification (2003). On location there is some 
expectation that firms locating in assisted areas (locations where they receive subsidies) could be 
more marginal through time (i.e. more grant dependent), and thus have lower survival rates. The 
review has also highlighted that industry affiliation can impact upon the likelihood of survival 
(Driffield, 1999). For example, over the period under consideration there has been displacement of 
more labour intensive manufacturing sectors such as electrical engineering to locations in eastern 
Europe and further afield due to their relative cost competitiveness. 
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   The explanatory variables also include the level of employment in the plant/firm. There is some 
evidence from our review that employment size can affect the likelihood of survival in different ways. 
Phelps and Fuller (2000) for example showed that the propensity for repeat investment at a given 
subsidiary could be associated with factors such as the extent of sunk costs which could be linked to 
subsidiary size. We experimented with a series of employment variables including average 
employment size during the life of the plant/firm, minimum and maximum employment levels and 
initial employment size. Log and quadratic specifications were also examined. In each case there was 
little variation in the underlying results as a result of different definitions of employment used. In 
what follows where the employment variable (EMPLOY) is reported, it reflects average employment 
during plant life. Finally there is a created variable measuring the age of the plant/firm since its 
inception (AGE). Although this coincides with years of survival for many plants/firms this is not 
always the case. 
   Table 4 presents the results from a series of different specifications of the hazard regressions 
covering the whole of the period 1966-2003. Model 1 of Table 4 shows that foreign owned plants 
have a significantly lower hazard ratio (0.41) and therefore better survival rate than domestically 
owned plants/firms. In Model 2 the issue of ownership is further disaggregated. In comparison to rest 
of UK owned plants/firms foreign firms have a hazard ratio of just 0.30 indicating a significantly 
better chance of survival. Interestingly Welsh owned plants/firms are more likely to have survived 
during the period than those where the ownership is located elsewhere in the UK. This might suggest 
that the latter are especially prone to closure during economic downturns as operations are maintained 
at headquarter locations. Finally plants/firms where ownership is not known in the data are found to 
have significantly lower survival rates than those in the other ownership categories. As noted above 
this category is likely to contain a number of very small plants and the result may reflect the 
susceptibility to closure of these plants over time. 
Table 4 & 5 about here 
In order to consider the relatively better survival rates for foreign owned firms/plants a number of 
additional explanatory variables are included. In the first place we examine whether the success of the 
foreign owned plants is related to employment size (Model 3). Recall that the variable EMPLOY here 
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reflects average employment in the plant/firm during its life time. The inclusion of this variable, 
proxying for the size of plants/firms has very little effect on the hazard ratio for any of the ownership 
groups. The results suggest that larger plants/firms survive longer than smaller ones and this 
marginally explains the favourable performance of foreign plants/firms. In contrast, it is the smaller 
Welsh owned firms that have better survival rates compared to their UK owned counterparts. 
   In contrast, the addition of the AGE variable in Model 4 works to improve the hazard ratio for 
foreign owned firms to 0.23. There is a suggestion here that older foreign firms may have better 
survival prospects having overcome the liability of foreignness and then successfully employing their 
ownership advantages over longer periods (see McCloughan and Stone, 1998). There would also seem 
to be a similar advantage to locally owned firms. 
   Finally in Model 5 dummy variables to capture whether a plant/firm locates in a grant assisted area 
are added. There is some indication, perhaps surprisingly, that plants/firms located in these areas have 
better survival rates than those located in areas where regional incentives are not available. However, 
the inclusion of these variables has little impact on the hazard ratio for foreign plants/firms or indeed 
that of either of the other two ownership groups.  
   The conclusion from Table 4 is therefore that ownership matters as far plant/firm survival is 
concerned and that the inclusion of other important influences on the likelihood of survival does little 
to counter that finding. Moreover there is evidence that foreign owned plants are more likely to 
survive over time than other plants/firms. Indeed even when the specification in Model 5 of Table 4 
was supplemented with 23 industry dummies (detailed results not shown here) the hazard ratio for 
foreign ownership was little changed (0.26) such that a further conclusion was that the relatively 
better survival duration of foreign firms in Wales was not due to industry sector specific effects. There 
is a suggestion from this analysis that foreign firms are more likely to be found in sectors such as 
chemicals, office machinery and medical equipment which had better overall survival prospects over 
the period than those in sectors such as clothing and leather, and basic metals and fabricated metals 
products. 
   Finally the analysis focused on the stability of the foreign owned plant hazard ratio over different 
time periods defined to capture different complete economic cycle over the period (see HM Treasury, 
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2005). Five time periods were selected and the final specification in Table 4 is used in each case. 
Looking first at the earliest period 1966-71 (see Table 5), the survival rates for foreign plants fare 
marginally higher than for UK owned plants/firms but this result was found not to be significant.  
Indeed there is little evidence to suggest that ownership patterns have an impact on the likelihood of 
firm survival during this period.  
   Over the period 1972-1977, in contrast, foreign owned plants are found to have better survival rates 
with a hazard ratio of 0.62, though locally owned firms have a slightly higher risk of closure than 
those where ownership is outside Wales, but in the rest of the UK. Over the remaining three periods 
the foreign owned firms continue to reveal lower hazard ratios as do Welsh owned firms. The stronger 
survival rates overall for foreign owned plants thus reflects their performance during the 1980s and 
beyond.  
5. Conclusions 
This study reveals that foreign owned manufacturing in Wales is associated with better survival 
prospects than domestic and indigenous regional firms, and that findings on better survival are robust 
in the context of a series of size, industry and age effects. The study also reveals that the relatively 
lower hazard ratio is a consistent feature of the foreign manufacturing sector over time. Unfortunately 
the WRME database was discontinued shortly after 2003 and it would have been very interesting to 
explore the relative hazard ratio during the most recent recessionary period. 
   We argued in the opening section that Wales was a useful lens through which to examine questions 
of foreign sector stability. Much had been made about Welsh historical inward investment success, 
and its role in achieving a manufacturing renaissance, but with some authors such as Lovering (1999) 
questioning its role in transformative regional development processes. There are also debates on the 
balance of policy resources between attracting new capital and improving the allegiance of foreign 
capital. Our results reveal that on one facet of embeddedness linked to stability and survival the 
foreign manufacturing sector performs relatively well. This might be taken as evidence supporting the 
use of monies to support new inward investment. However, the opening part of the paper also showed 
that embeddedness covers other factors such as the functions undertaken in foreign subsidiaries and 
the buyer-supplier linkages maintained by foreign firms including as a means through which 
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knowledge passes from multinational to domestic enterprises. While the results show that relatively 
high levels of historical inward investment success are not marred by a lack of stability in foreign 
plants, there is still a question of the nature and quality of the foreign manufacturing plant stock.     
   In this respect the methods adopted in our paper focus on what can be more easily quantified in 
terms of entry and exit. Lovering (1999) revealed the challenge to develop the evidence base on the 
contribution of inward investment. The methods adopted in this paper can only take us part way to 
fully developing this evidence base. For example, the earlier review showed that other factors such as 
the level of local decision making capacity in inward investors, the types of occupations supported, 
and embeddedness in terms of local supply chain linkages are also expected to be important in 
assessing how far inward investment is developing to transform the region. Then there is a challenge 
here for deeper analysis to reveal more about the changing characteristics of the stock of inward 
investment in Wales. This would need to progress using more qualitative methods such as in depth 
case studies. In summary a survival analysis only disentangles one part of the puzzle relating to how 
far inward investment into a regional economy might or might not be transformative. 
   Moreover, following from the perspectives offered from evolutionary economic geography the 
survival analysis only provides some insights into what exactly is being reproduced in the region 
through foreign entry and foreign exit, and with other characteristics of the stock (that is in terms 
depth of function, and local linkages) having a strong influence on the economic trajectory of the 
region, locking the region into one development path (see Martin and Sunley, 2006).    
   In this respect one regional challenge identified has been to try and attract firms which score well on 
other facets of embeddeness includiQJDQHHGWRDWWUDFWPRUHµ+4-W\SH¶RSHUDWLRQVLQWKHUHJLRQVHH
Welsh Government, 2009). Indeed current government inquiries into how far Wales might gain tax 
varying powers could link closely to the potential to gain more KLJKHUYDOXHDGGHGµ+4-W\SH¶ 
functions in local foreign manufacturing firms (Silk Commission, 2012).  
   In conclusion, the paper inevitably raises a challenge for more research to be undertaken in Wales to 
understand the connection between inward investment and the evolutionary trajectory of the region.  
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Figure 1: Estimated employment in foreign-owned and domestic plants in Wales from WRME 
database 1966-2003 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Plants and Employment by Ownership and Business Structure, Selected Years 
 
Sample (Ownership / 
Business Structure 
Classification) 
1966 1972 1977 1986 1997 2003 
 Plants 
(N) 
Emp. Mean Plants 
(N) 
Emp. Mean Plants 
(N) 
Emp. Mean Plants 
(N) 
Emp. Mean Plants 
(N) 
Emp. Mean Plants 
(N) 
Emp. Mean 
                   
Single-plant in Wales 552 24,946 45.2 846 30,418 36.0 987 30,781 31.2 1,226 30,857 25.2 1,080 38,984 36.1 880 33,360 37.9 
More than 1 plant in Wales  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
At least 1 plant outside 
Wales 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
U.K. single-plant in Wales 498 74,492 149.6 654 78,957 120.7 681 71,002 104.3 509 35,217 69.2 323 28,984 89.7 265 25,949 97.9 
U.K. more than 1 plant in 
Wales 
208 119,574 574.9 268 119,334 445.3 311 116,700 375.2 303 66,630 219.9 236 52,627 223.0 149 35,444 237.9 
                   
Domestic plants 1,293 221,602 171.4 1,843 231,934 125.8 2,561 223,685 87.3 2,169 136,721 63.0 1,693 124,756 73.7 1,339 99,042 74.0 
                   
E.U. 44 16,613 377.6 69 24,254 351.5 90 28,557 317.3 128 20,151 157.4 136 20,584 151.4 110 17,421 158.4 
Non-E.U. Europe .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 1,525 101.7 20 2,112 105.6 15 1,935 129.0 
North America 77 47,802 620.8 105 49,558 472.0 122 48,216 395.2 150 36,172 241.1 158 33,752 213.6 136 28,849 212.1 
Asia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19 7,098 373.6 43 17,391 404.4 39 12,287 315.1 
Other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
                   
Foreign owned plants 139 71,158 511.9 201 80,837 402.2 251 85,161 339.3 336 66,341 197.4 375 75,540 201.4 315 62,400 198.1 
                   
All 1,432 292,760 204.4 2,044 312,771 153.0 2,812 308,846 109.8 2,505 203,062 81.1 2,072 200,323 96.7 1,713 165,484 96.6 
                   
 
Notes: Plants with no ownership classification or being part of the unknown classification are not included in the table. The columns therefore may not sum to the All totals.  
.. Not reported due to sample < 10 plants. Emp. = employee numbers. 
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Table 2: Plant Entry and Exit  
 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
                    
Entry (Plants) - 90 123 160 133 115 143 170 144 492 194 212 135 156 153 149 176 155 185 
Entry Rate (%) - 6.3 8.3 10.0 7.7 6.2 7.4 8.3 6.7 21.9 7.2 7.8 4.8 5.9 6.2 5.9 7.1 6.2 7.4 
                    
Exit (Plants) - 30 13 30 32 47 50 48 65 150 120 266 371 103 154 157 148 164 178 
Exit Rate (%) - 2.1 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.0 6.7 4.5 9.8 13.2 3.9 6.3 6.3 6.0 6.5 7.1 
Exits of which 
(plants):  
                   
Transfer - 14 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10 .. 11 .. 11 .. 
Branch plant closure - .. .. .. 14 .. 23 21 .. 40 32 44 44 50 81 75 69 58 48 
ENM closure - .. .. .. .. 20 .. .. 31 34 34 48 44 31 51 52 52 65 67 
                    
Net Change (Plants)  - 58 111 136 120 78 109 106 95 435 46 86 -147 -205 46 -31 41 -3 1 
 
Notes: 1966 values not reported due to the absence of end of 1965 year employment data. Entry and exit rates calculated as a %age of the stock recorded at the start of each year. .. 
Not reported given small sample < 10 plants, or values have been removed to avoid disclosure. Some exit forms are unknown so that columns may therefore not sum.Net 
change totals may not directly correspond to the sum of reported annual plant entries and exits due to differences in the timing of the recording of plant openings and closures and initial or 
final employment information.  
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
                    
Entry (Plants) 207 182 152 140 118 130 65 87 60 58 50 39 43 17 30 65 50 47 14 
Entry Rate (%) 8.2 7.2 6.1 5.7 4.9 5.2 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.6 2.3 1.8 2.0 0.8 1.5 3.3 2.5 2.5 0.8 
                    
Exit (Plants) 257 182 110 115 82 129 190 158 116 127 82 88 57 80 49 181 113 153 45 
Exit Rate (%) 10.2 7.2 4.4 4.7 3.4 5.1 7.4 6.3 4.9 5.6 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.9 2.4 9.1 5.7 8.1 2.5 
Exits of which 
(plants): 
                   
Transfer .. .. .. .. .. 12 .. 10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Branch plant closure 63 46 32 49 27 53 79 47 41 58 26 27 23 37 34 141 56 .. .. 
ENM closure 74 59 46 48 35 34 97 86 56 44 21 27 18 31 .. 19 21 .. .. 
                    
Net Change (Plants) 31 -40 -35 -75 114 44 -49 -138 -102 -71 -42 -28 -51 -70 -20 -7 -92 -78 -92 
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Table 3: Gross and Net Employment Flows 
 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
              
Gross Gainers (Plants) - 574 799 928 967 861 899 1,094 1,114 1,264 1,250 1,261 1,133 
Gross Losers (Plants) - 527 433 403 542 760 799 684 778 1,018 1,124 1,021 1,110 
Gross Gains (Employees) - 10,778 20,680 26,756 27,960 16,093 21,039 26,436 22,411 20,038 17,105 20,957 19,115 
Gross Losses (Employees) - 16,832 11,039 10,755 13,062 26,517 25,089 14,641 14,624 32,908 31,187 17,512 27,809 
              
Net Change - -6,054 9,641 16,001 14,897 -10,424 -4,050 11,795 7,787 -12,870 -14,082 3,445 -8,695 
              
 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
              
Gross Gainers (Plants) 972 973 813 1,023 1,048 1,167 1,206 1,185 1,248 920 1,136 958 809 
Gross Losers (Plants) 904 912 1,019 988 910 844 912 828 665 499 599 645 688 
Gross Gains (Employees) 16,703 14,464 9,406 11,539 13,881 16,078 14,259 16,953 19,187 16,414 24,312 16,487 12,589 
Gross Losses (Employees) 21,225 33,503 50,419 27,647 26,212 18,043 16,006 17,316 12,692 10,071 12,556 17,075 20,807 
              
Net Change -4,522 -19,040 -41,013 -16,108 -12,331 -1,964 -1,747 -364 6,495 6,343 11,756 -587 -8,218 
              
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
              
Gross Gainers (Plants) 882 765 894 905 796 591 819 464 618 639 353 494  
Gross Losers (Plants) 931 766 605 477 470 484 711 521 725 729 410 770  
Gross Gains (Employees) 13,490 13,069 17,325 13,524 14,267 10,733 16,751 9,833 11,957 24,148 11,988 11,461  
Gross Losses (Employees) 25,379 24,954 17,513 11,892 10,269 10,928 18,470 13,498 17,143 28,908 22,953 20,006  
              
Net Change -11,889 -11,885 -189 1,632 3,998 -195 -1,719 -3,664 -5,186 -4,760 -10,965 -8,545  
              
 
Notes: 1966 values not reported due to the absence of end of 1965 year employment data. Columns may not sum due to rounding. 
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Table 4 Basic Hazards 1966-2003  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Estimate Std 
error 
P 
value 
Estimate Std 
error 
P 
value 
Estimate Std 
error 
P 
value 
Estimate Std 
error 
P value Estimate Std 
error 
P value 
Foreign 0.406 0.024 0.000* 0.304 0.019 0.000* 0.315 0.020 0.000* 0.229 0.015 0.000* 0.229 0.014 0.000* 
Wales    0.691 0.024 0.000* 0.650 0.023 0.000* 0.571 0.020 0.000* 0.571 0.020 0.000* 
Own NK    3.094 0.138 0.000* 2.875 0.134 0.000* 3.441 0.158 0.000* 3.431 0.158 0.000* 
Employment       0.999 0.000 0.000* 1.000 0.000 0.039** 1.000 0.000 0.042** 
Age          0.967 0.001 0.000* 0.967 0.001 0.000* 
Dev Area             0.950 0.038 0.201 
Int Area             0.920 0.045 0.090 
                
Log L -36,095.567 -35,621.173 -35,600.678 -35,287.500 -35,286.038 
/5Ȥ2 291.510 1240.030 1281.880 1907.64 1910.56 
3UREȤ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 84,368 84,368 84,368 84,368 84,368 
Note: Log L gives the maximised log-likelihood value. LR gives the likelihood ration test value. * P<0.01 ** P< 0.05 
 
Table 5. Foreign firm hazard ratio through time 
 
1966-71 1972-77 1977-86 1986-97 1997-03 
 Estimate Std 
error 
P value Estimate Std 
error 
P value Estimate Std 
error 
P value Estimate Std 
error 
P value Estimate Std 
error 
P value 
Foreign 1.082 0.365 0.815 0.620 0.153 0.053 0.450 0.058 0.000* 0.462 0.049 0.000* 0.698 0.094 0.008* 
Wales 0.753 0.122 0.081 1.061 0.105 0.550 0.668 0.042 0.000* 0.649 0.042 0.000* 0.688 0.071 0.000* 
Own NK 1.914 1.455 0.393 10.281 1.317 0.000* 5.048 0.339 0.000* 7.360 1.132 0.000* 0.064 0.065 0.006* 
Employment 0.999 0.000 0.894 1.000 0.000 0.581 1.000 0.000 0.984 0.998 0.000 0.000* 1.000 0.000 0.422 
Age 0.830 0.011 0.000* 0.883 0.005 0.000* 0.940 0.002 0.000* 0.943 0.003 0.000* 0.989 0.003 0.002* 
Dev Area 0.789 0.156 0.229 0.884 0.082 0.186 1.014 0.066 0.835 0.863 0.068 0.061 0.882 0.106 0.298 
Int Area 0.840 0.204 0.473 0.771 0.952 0.035** 0.954 0.075 0.554 0.993 0.091 0.938 0.973 0.140 0.851 
                
Log L -1106.240 -5282.774 -13,152.73 -9,774.095 -3887.535 
/5Ȥ2 416.320 876.08 1400.57 728.79 43.00 
3UREȤ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 10,052 14,657 22,699 25,600 11,360 
 
Note: Log L gives the maximised log-likelihood value. LR gives the likelihood ration test value. * P<0.01 ** P< 0.05
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 For a very small number of records significant elements of the data were absent and these were 
necessarily excluded. A further feature of the WRME dataset is the truncation of recorded plant 
employment, with data only collected systematically for manufacturing plants with more than 10 
employees. However, data on some plants with 10 or fewer employees have been recorded. Despite 
WKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDWWKH\PD\QRWEHIXOO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQRI³PLFUR´SODQWVWKLV
information was as far as possible retained for the empirical analysis, in part because of the generally 
limited opportunities to conduct analysis of the empirical dynamics of such micro-plants (or firms) in 
a UK regional context using official business microdata. 
2 We are grateful to the Welsh Government for their permission to use this data, without which the 
analysis in this paper would not have been possible. 
3 The reason for the increased number of recorded plants below the official WRME employment 
threshold in this period is not clear. It should also be noted that more generally across other periods 
there is some recording of plants where employment was above the official size threshold at some 
point but then subsequently dropped below this size requirement.   
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